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Introduction 
During the pioneering days of the electric utility 
industry, it was believed that utilities were natural 
monopolies, meaning that one utility could ser- 
vice a geographic area more cheaply than any 
combination of smaller utilities. More recently, 
the economic viability of transferring or wheeling 
electricity over long distances, the development 
of small-scale generators and efficient windmill 
and solar power, and the increased use of cogen- 
eration have undermined the view of electric util- 
ities as natural monopolies. Nevertheless, electric 
utilities continue to be monopolies because regu- 
latory agencies, such as the Public Utilities Com- 
mission of Ohio (PUCO), give them exclusive 
rights to produce and distribute electricity in 
designated markets. 
These regulatory agencies also 
attempt to impose profit ceilings on electric utili- 
ties in order to push the price and consumption 
of electricity away from monopolistic levels and 
toward competitive levels. This is accomplished 
by regulating the rate of return on capital of elec- 
tric utilities. The regulator determines a "fair" rate 
of return that is sufficient to allow a utility to 
cover its capital costs. With production costs and 
the demand for electricity, this "fair" rate deter- 
mines the price of electricity. 
The impact of this type of regulation 
on the production decisions of regulated utilities 
was first described by Averch and Johnson (1962). 
They argued that this regulation gives utilities the 
incentive to overcapitalize, that is, to employ a 
capital-labor ratio that is larger than one that mini- 
mizes costs for a given output level.'  Thus, utili- 
ties operating under this constraint are not produc- 
ing electricity as cheaply as they could. Virtually 
all empirical tests of regulatory bias to date have 
adopted the Averch and Johnson (A-J)  model, 
and most have found an overcapitalization bias2 
The major challenge to the A-J 
model concerns the nature of the regulatory envi- 
ronment. Implicit in the A-J model is a regulator 
that constantly monitors capital returns and adjusts 
electricity prices to keep capital returns at "fair" 
levels. Joskow (1974) argues that regulators are 
more concerned with nominal electricity prices 
than with the rate of return on capital. As long as 
nominal electricity prices do  not increase, regula- 
tors will not actively enforce the rate-of-return 
constraint, thereby eliminating the source of the 
A-J bias. Moreover, utilities face additional con- 
straints, such as fuel-cost-adjustment clauses, 
environmental regulations, strict rules about what 
capital is allowed in the rate base, and the 
requirement to meet all demand at given electric- 
ity prices. When these additional constraints are 
taken into account, the net impact on a utility's 
production decisions is not clear. 
Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984) de- 
veloped a generalized cost model that allows for 
the impact of additional regulatory constraints 
and found empirical evidence of their impact on 
......................................... 
This interpretation of the A-J result is attributed to Baumol and  1  Klevorick (1970). 
Gourville (1974), Spann (1974), Petersen (1975), Cowing (1978),  2  and  klson  and Wohar (19831, for example,  test only for an over. 
capitalization bias against an alternative hypothesis of  no bias. Of  these 
papers, only Nelson and Wohar do not find an overcapitalization bias. 
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utility production decisions. However, no one has 
formally tested the implications of Joskow's view. 
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by 
estimating a modified version of Atkinson and 
Halvorsen's model. The modifications are of two 
sorts. The first allows for different regulatory 
impacts over time as argued by Joskow. The 
second permits the use of panel data and the 
estimation of total factor productivity and its 
components to evaluate more accurately the 
impact of regulation on the technical change 
implemented by utilities. 
The Short-Run Effect of Regulation on Utility Prices 
Price 
Demand  -  Marginal Costs 
--- Marginal Revenue  -  Average Costs 
SOURCE: Authors. 
FIGURE  1 
The data are a panel sample of the 
seven major electric utilities in Ohio over the 
period 1965 to 1982.3 Ohio utility data were used 
because of general interest to most residents of 
the Fourth Federal Reserve District. Also, because 
these utilities are all privately owned, coal- 
burning plants that are subject to the same regu- 
lator, their technologies should be fairly similar. 
Thus, the estimation of a common cost structure 
for these utilities should yield a smaller potential 
for specification bias than is true of all previous 
studies of electric utilities, whose samples 
include utilities that employ varying technologies 
and/or face different regulators. 
3 
The seven major electric utilities in Ohio are Ohio Power;  Cincin- 
nati Gas and Electric; Cleveland Electric Illuminating; Columbus 
and Southern Ohio Electric; Dayton Power and Light; Ohio  Edison; and 
Toledo Edison. Over  the 1965 to 1982 period, they accounted for about 
90 percent of electric power sales in Ohio. 
We find considerable circumstantial 
evidence consistent with Joskow's more general 
regulatory mechanism. However, the estimation 
results suggest that the impact of regulation in 
Ohio does not completely square with Joskow's 
expectation. In opposition to  Joskow's view, we 
find that these utilities produce electricity with 
their prevailing technologies more efficiently dur- 
ing the years when Joskow expects regulatory 
constraints to be more binding. In Joskow's favor, 
we find that regulation retards the rate of techni- 
cal change implemented by these utilities to a 
greater extent during the years when Joskow ex- 
pects tighter regulatory constraints. To our knowl- 
edge, this is the first paper to explicitly estimate a 
regulatory impact on technical change in the 
electric utility indust~y.~  Moreover, this type of 
inefficiency is surprisingly large in magnitude. 
Thus, the emphasis regulators and economists 
place on efficient production using a given capi- 
tal stock appears to be misplaced; the retardation 
of technical change implemented by these utili- 
ties appears to be an important source of bias. 
The first part of this paper reviews 
the regulatory process and contrasts the A-J and 
Joskow views. Next, the rate hearing experience  1 1 
in Ohio during the 1965 to 1982 period is dis- 
cussed and is found to correspond quite well 
with Joskow's view of the regulatory mechanism. 
The third section describes the empirical results. 
I.  The Regulatory Process 
It is useful to view the regulatory process in two 
parts: 1) the mechanics of setting a utility's elec- 
tricity price structure, and 2) the events that 
initiate a rate hearing or a review of a utility's 
electricity price structure. There is little disagree- 
ment among economists about the first part. Sim- 
ply put, a regulatory agency such as PUCO 
attempts to maintain a competitive price for elec- 
tricity by regulating the rate of return on a utility's 
capital. It establishes a "fair" rate of return (r), 
taking into account all of a utility's production 
costs and the demand for its electricity, that is 
consistent with a "fair" level of profit and that is 
slightly higher than the utility's cost of capital. 
The "fair" return or profit on capital is then 
T,=  Br, 
where B is the rate base or the book value of the 
utility's net capital stock. The basis for a rate 
change and, hence, a change in the price of elec- 
tricity, is the difference between this "fair" return 
on capital and the utility's accounting return on 
4 
Nelson and Wohar (1983) estimated the impact of a rate-of-return 
constraint on  TFP and calculated its impact on technical change 
as a residual. lsrailevich and Kowalewski  (1987) argue that  this residual 
is an incorrect estimate  of the regulatory impact on  technical change. 
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capital (T), which is the difference between the 
utility's operating revenues (R)  and its operating 
costs (  0C):5 
7T = R-OC 
Electricity prices are set by the regulator to equate 
7~ with n, on the date of  the hearing. If  7~ is less 
than T,, electricity prices are raised, while if 7~ is 
greater than T,, electricity prices are decreased. 
This mechanism is shown in figure 
1, assuming there is only one utility serving the 
market for electricity. If there were no regulation, 
the utility would maximize profits (or minimize 
costs) by equating marginal revenues with mar- 
ginal costs, producing quantity Qm  and charging a 
price P,.  Its profits would be Qm(Pm-  AC,).  If 
the utility was acting like a perfectly competitive 
firm, it would maximize profits (and minimize so- 
cial costs) by equating the market price, P,,  to its 
marginal costs and to its average costs and would 
produce the quantity Q,.  In this case, its profits 
would be zero. Note, however, that at both Pm 
and PC,  production is efficient in the sense that 
input-factor marginal products are equated to 
their market prices. A regulator picks some price 
P, that is less than Pm but greater than PC,  giving 
the utility a "fair" profit of  Q,(Pr - AC,)  to cover 
capital costs. At this point, production is inefficient. 
This is a general description of  the 
price-adjustment mechanism of an electric utility 
regulator. What brings a utility to a rate hearing 
and what motivates a regulator are questions de- 
bated by economists. The predominant answers to 
these questions were influenced by Averch and 
Johnson. They investigated the optimal response 
of a cost-minimizing utility in static equilibrium 
to a "fair" rate of return on capital regulatory con- 
straint. They showed that when the rate of  return 
on capital constraint is binding, and when the 
"fair" rate of return is larger than the cost of capi- 
tal, a utility has the incentive to overcapitalize; 
that is, to employ a capital-labor ratio that is larger 
than the one that minimizes costs for the chosen 
output level6 This is called the Aj  bias. 
Implicit in the A-J model is the 
assumption that the motivating factor behind 
regulatory action is the rate of return on capital. 
In the A-J model, the constraint on a utility's 
profit-maximization actions is that the actual rate 
of return on capital earned by a utility is no 
greater than the "fair" rate. Another assumption is 
that an active regulator continually monitors util- 
ity returns and pounds on a utility with a "visible 
hand" to maintain the equality of a utility's profits 
5 Operating costs include all nonupital costs of production. 
6 
Actually, Baumol and Klevorick (1970) argue that Averch and 
Johnson did not prove this as a general result. Note that if there 
are additional production factors, then the amount of  capital relative to 
these other inputs also will be higher than for the cost-minimizing  firm. 
with its "fair" profits. When a utility's profits are 
less than its "fair" level of  profits, the regulator 
calls a rate hearing to raise r and, hence, the utili- 
ty's price of electricity. When a utility's profits are 
above the "fair" level, the regulator calls a rate 
hearing to lower rand the price of electricity. 
With minor amendments, this view 
of regulatory behavior predominates in the eco- 
nomics literature, especially in empirical studies 
of electric utility behavior, with the exception of 
Joskow (1974).'  Joskow agrees that rate-of-return 
regulation will give a utility the incentive to 
employ an inefficient mix of  input factors, but he 
argues that the A-J bias may not always occur. In 
Joskow's view, regulators are political institutions 
whose objective is to minimize "conflict and crit- 
icism," not to keep the rate of  return on capital 
equal to the "fair" rate. 
One important source of conflict 
and criticism is an increase in the nominal price 
of electricity. Consumers will agitate against 
increases in electricity prices because they typi- 
cally view these increases as price-gouging. If 
electricity prices are not increasing, and especially 
if  they are falling, consumers are indifferent to 
the profits earned by a utility. Thus, Joskow 
argues that if  utilities are able to adjust their pro- 
duction and investment decisions to raise their 
earned rates of  return without raising electricity 
prices, they will not be thwarted by the regulator. 
In this case, there may be little A-J bias. On the 
other hand, Joskow argues that regulators do not 
initiate any actions to raise the rate of return on a 
utility's capital when it is below the "fair" rate 
unless requested to do so by the utility. Before a 
rate increase is granted, the utility will earn a 
return on capital below the "fair" return. In this 
case, an A-J bias may appear. 
Thus, in contrast to the active A-J 
regulator, the Joskow regulator is passive, adjust- 
ing the rate of return on a utility's capital only 
when requested to do so by a utility or by a con- 
sumer advocate. As time passes, earned profits 
may deviate Erom  "fair" profits if  input prices, 
electricity demand, and other factors change, but 
the regulator does not initiate a price change to 
re-equate earned profits with "fair" profits until 
the next rate hearing. In the meantime, a utility 
can alter its production and investment decisions 
in ways opposite to those predicted by the A-J 
model. The "fair" rate of  return is a means to an 
end (uncontroversial electricity prices), not an 
end in itself, in Joskow's view. After reviewing the 
regulatory experience across the U.S. between the 
1950s and early 1970s,  Joskow concludes that: 
Contrary to the popular view, it does notap- 
I 
A slight modification to the A-J regulatory process was the intro- 
duction of a "regulatory lag"; see, for example, Bailey and 
Coleman (1971) and Baumol and Klevorick (1970). 
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The Relationship of Electricity Prices 
and Sales to the Frequency of Rate Hearings 
Electricity Prices (per kilowatt-hour) 
Current dollars 
Electricity Sales 
Billions of kilowatt-hours 
Rate Hearing Frequency 
Percent of seven utilities 
SOURCE: Public Utilities Commission of Ohio and Standard and Poor's 
Cornpustat Services, Inc., Utility Cornpustat II. 
This regulatory process is therefore ex- 
tremely passive. Regulators take no action 
regarding prices unless major increases or 
structural changes are initiated by the firms 
under its jurisdiction. In short, it is the 
firms themselves which trigger a regulatory 
rate of return review. There is no "allowed" 
rate of return that regulatory commissions 
are continually monitoring and at some 
specified point enforcing. (p. 298) 
Because they work in a political en- 
vironment, public utility commissions face other 
sources of conflict and criticism, which have re- 
sulted in two additional constraints on utility 
behavior. First, when energy costs increased rapid- 
ly in the mid-197Os, utilities requested rate hear- 
ings in greater numbers than in the past. This in- 
creased caseload put a large burden on regulatory 
agencies, who were accustomed to only a few 
hearings per year. The time lag between the 
request for a rate hearing and a change in elec- 
tricity prices increased, and many utilities were 
forced to request another rate hearing immediately 
after their previous hearing. In order to shorten 
this lag and to appease utilities, regulators insti- 
tuted fuel-cost-adjustment clauses that permitted 
utilities to pass on higher fuel costs to consumers 
without the need for a formal rate hearing. 
Second, the fossil-fuel generators 
operating before the mid- 1970s emitted a consid- 
erable amount of pollution into the atmosphere. 
Successful agitation by environmental advocates 
forced public utility commissions to establish 
limits on the amount of pollution that utilities 
could emit. These additional constraints compli- 
cate the analysis of the impact of a rate-of-return 
constraint on utility behavior. 
FIGURE  2 
pear that regulatory agencies have been con- 
cerned with regulating rates of return per 
se. The primary concern of regulatory com- 
missions has been to keep nominalprices 
from increasing. Firms which can increase 
their earned rates of  return without raising 
prices or by lowering prices (depending 
on changing cost and demand characteris- 
tics) have been permitted to earn virtually 
any rate of  return that they can. Formal 
regulato  y action in the form of  rate of 
return review kprimarily triggered by  firms 
attempting to raise the level of their rates or 
to make major changes in the structure of 
their rates. The rate of return is then used 
to establish a new set of ceiling prices 
which the firm must live with until another 
regulatory hearing is triggered. General 
price reductions  do not trigger regulatory 
review, but are routinely approved without 
formal rate of  return review. 
11.  Rate Hearings and Average Costs 
of Ohio Utilities: 1965 to 1982 
Some evidence consistent with Joskow's view of 
the regulatory mechanism is found in the history 
of rate hearings in Ohio between 1965 and 1982. 
To put this evidence into perspective, first con- 
sider the behavior of the average price per 
kilowatt-hour of electricity charged, and the quan- 
tity of  kilowatt-hours sold, by the seven major 
Ohio electric utilities (figure 2). 
For the purposes of this discussion, 
three distinct periods of different electricity price 
and consumption behavior can be seen: 1965 to 
1968, 1969 to 1975, and 1976 to 1982.8  Within 
.......................................... 
8 
Note that the average price shown in figure 2 is not the regulated 
price, but the ratio of average total revenue for the seven utilities 
to their average total sales. In general, different consumers face different 
regulated price schedules, and utilities serving different geographic 
markets may be allowed to charge different prices for the same category 
of consumer. 
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each period, the directions of change in price and 
quantity were the same for each utility in the sam- 
ple. During the 1965 to 1968 period, the average 
price of electricity changed very little and electric- 
ity sales rose considerably. During the 1969 to 
1975 period, the average annual growth rate of 
electricity sales slowed, while that of prices 
increased greatly. Between 1976 and 1982, the 
electricity sales declined for the first time in 
Ohio's history, while prices increased at their fast- 
est average annual percentage rate. 
It is important to note that the 
average price shown in figure 2 is also the aver- 
age cost of electricity. All  regulators, including the 
PUCO, define the price of capital to be i-r divided 
by B, hence equating operating revenues with 
operating costs. The neoclassical economist's 
measure of  average cost uses a market price of 
capital and, hence, the neoclassical measure of 
average costs can differ from the PUCO's defini- 
tion. Bemdt and Fuss (1986) argue that a capital 
price measure such as that used by the PUCO is 
more appropriate because it is a rental price or 
user cost of capital and because it controls for 
changes in capacity utilization. For these reasons, 
and because it is the measure the PUCO  uses and 
to which utilities respond, the rental price of  cap- 
ital is employed in this paper. 
Figure 2 also shows the percentage 
of the seven utilities requesting rate hearings in 
each year. In the first period, utilities rarely re- 
quested rate hearings, and their average costs were 
falling. This behavior corresponds  with Joskow's 
first proposition: "During periods of  falling average 
cost we expect to observe virtually no regulatory 
rate of  return reviews" (p. 299). The average price 
of electricity was also falling during this period, 
consistent with Joskow's second proposition: "Dur- 
ing periods of falling average costs we expect to 
observe constant or falling prices charged by reg- 
ulated firms" (p. 299). Given that there were few 
rate hearings in this period, it is plausible that 
utility returns on capital were greater than or 
equal to the "fair" returns the PUCO would have 
defined had they been requested to do so.'  Ac- 
cording to Joskow, if actual returns were lower 
than the "fair" return, then the utilities would 
have asked for price increases. Hence Joskow's 
third proposition: "During periods of falling aver- 
age costs we expect to observe rising or constant 
(profit maximizing) rates of return" (p. 299). 
During the 1969 to 1975 period, 
average costs increased slightly, triggering a 
modest increase in the frequency of  hearings, 
while during the 1976 to 1982 period, average 
.......................................... 
It can never be known whether earned returns were greater than 
"fair" returns because there were no rate hearings for all firms 
during these years.  I 
costs increased tremendously. Production costs in- 
creased in the late 1960s because of inflation stimu- 
lated by economic policies; they increased very 
quickly and unexpectedly in the mid-1970s be- 
cause of inflation engendered by worldwide food 
shortages and by the Arab oil embargo. For a given 
electricity price, such increases in operating costs 
drove utility profits below their "fair" levels. Utili- 
ties promptly responded to these cost increases 
by requesting electricity price increases that, in 
most cases, were granted by the PUCO. The fre- 
quency of hearings increased sharply as utilities 
had trouble keeping up with the effects of the 
rapid rise in costs. Viewing the 1969 to 1975 
period as a transition from a period of falling 
average costs to one of  rising average costs, the 
modest increase in rate hearings during this period 
is consistent with Joskow's fifth proposition: 
The transition from a period of falling 
average costs to one of rising average costs 
for a particular regulated industry will at 
first yield no observable increase in the 
number of  rate of  return reviews filed by 
the regulatory agency, but as cost increases 
continue more and more rate of return 
reviews are triggered as firms seek price 
increases to keep their earned rates of 
return at least at the level that they expect 
the commission will allow in a formal reg- 
ulatory hearing. (p. 300) 
For estimation purposes, the 1965 to 
1982 interval was divided into two periods: 1965 
to 1973 and 1974 to 1982. Testable hypotheses of 
the A3 and Joskow views deal with the absolute 
and relative production inefficiencies of  the utili- 
ties in these two periods. The near absence of 
regulatory hearings in the first period would sug- 
gest, to both Joskow and A3, that earned rates of 
return of these utilities were at least as great as 
"fair" rates of return. Averch and Johnson would 
argue that earned rates of  return were lower than 
monopoly rates of  return and, hence, that the A3 
bias should exist in the first period. On the other 
hand,  Joskow would argue that earned rates of 
return may have been close to monopoly rates. If 
this were true, then because monopoly rates are 
consistent with efficient production, there may 
have been very little Ad  bias in the first period. 
Indeed, as Joskow argues in his seventh proposi- 
tion, production may have been very efficient in 
the first period because reducing costs would 
have contributed to higher earned rates of return 
that were not taken away by regulators: 
During periods of falling or constant nom- 
inal average costs firms have an incentive 
to produce efficiently since all profits may 
be kept as long as prices stay below the 
level established by the regulatory com- 
mission in the last formal rate of return 
review. (p. 303) 
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The high frequency of hearings in 
the 1974 to 1982 period suggests that earned 
rates of return for these utilities were lower than 
"fair" rates of return for most of the period; that 
is, .rr < T,.  Because these earned rates were even 
further away from monopolistic rates of return, 
Joskow would argue that it is more likely there 
are inefficiencies of the A-J type in the second 
period. His proposition eight says: "During peri- 
ods of rising average costs A-J type biases may 
begin to become important" (p. 304). He does 
not exclude the possibility that firms may con- 
tinue to try to be as efficient as they were in the 
first period in order to earn greater than "fair" 
rates of return. However, he argues: 
Unless the direction of the cost path can 
be changed, however, the continuous inter- 
action of firms and regulators in formal regu- 
latory hearings, resulting from the necessity 
to raise output prices, is exactly the situa- 
tion for which the A-J type model (with 
some modifications) would hold. I would 
therefore expect that it is under this situa- 
tion of continuously rising output prices, 
triggering rate of return reviews that the A-J 
type models and the associated results are 
most useful. (p. 304) 
Thus, Joskow would argue that 
utilities would try to organize their production 
more efficiently in the first period than in the 
second period. His concept of production effi- 
ciency includes the static notion of employing 
currently available production inputs in the least- 
cost way for any given level of output (that is, 
employing the least-cost combination of inputs 
along a given isoquant) and the dynamic notion 
of investing in more productive capital over time 
(that is, investing in productive capital to push 
the family of isoquants toward the origin). Averch 
and Johnson deal only with the static notion of 
productive inefficiency because their model ana- 
lyzes a static equilibrium. They would argue that 
the amounts of this static inefficiency are the 
same in both periods because they assume a reg- 
ulator who maintains the earned rate of return on 
capital at its "fair" rate. 
The distinction between the static 
and dynamic notions of production efficiency is 
important. When a public utility commission 
conducts a rate hearing, it pays attention only to 
the static notion of production efficiency. Indeed, 
most models of regulatory impact deal only with 
the static notion. However, it is conceivable that 
111.  Empirical Evidence About 
the A-J and Joskow  Views 
The A-J and Joskow views are examined using a 
modified version of the Atkinson and Halvorsen 
(1984) generalized long-run cost-function ap- 
proach with capital (K), labor (L),  and fuel  (F) 
as inputs.'O  Atkinson and Halvorsen argued that 
the long-run neoclassical cost-function approach 
is incorrect for a regulated firm because it 
assumes the firm is minimizing costs in a per- 
fectly competitive world constrained only to pro- 
duce a given level of output.ll When a firm is 
subject to a number of regulatory constraints, as 
is generally true today, firms view all input prices 
differently from their market or rental prices. The 
exact specification of these nonmarket or 
"shadow" prices depends on the exact form of 
the additional constraints.  Atkinson and Hal- 
vorsen approximated these shadow prices by 
simple proportional relationships with market 
prices; that is, the shadow price of input i:  P,*= 
ki<,  where Pi  is its market price and ki  is a con- 
stant. Thus, the generalized cost function is 
simply the neoclassical cost function with PT 
substituted for Pi. Instead of minimizing long- 
run actual costs, a utility is assumed to minimize 
long-run shadow costs by equating the shadow 
marginal cost of each input with the amount of 
the input used. 
The modifications made to the 
Atkinson and Halvorsen approach are 1) the 
inclusion of time variables to accommodate panel 
data and to permit the estimation of total factor 
productivity (  TFP)  and its returns to scale and 
pure technical change components, and 2) the 
distinction between the 1965 to 1973 and 1974 to 
1982 time periods. 
TFP is measured as the change in 
the cost of production not due to changes in in- 
put prices, and reflects the overall productivity of 
all inputs rather than the productivity of a single 
input such as labor. The neoclassical approach to 
the measurement of  TFP assumes an optimal dis- 
tribution of production resources in a firm, which 
is an inappropriate assumption for regulated 
electric utilities. The generalized-cost-function 
approach yields an estimate of TFP that is con- 
sistent with regulated behavior. The most impor- 
tant variable for examining Joskow's view on 
productivity behavior is the pure technical 
change component of  TFP  Gollop and Roberts 
(1981), among others, argue that this component 
is a better measure of productivity than TFP 
regulation also affects the rate of technical change  "  -  .......................................... 
implemented by utilities; if  regulation biases the 
amount of capital employed by a utility, it may 
also bias the type of capital employed. Regulatory 
impacts on overall inefficiency and on the rate of 
technical change are estimated below. 
10 
See  lsrailevich and Kowalewski (1987) for complete details 
about the data, the specification and estimation of the 
shadow-cost model, and the results. 
Nevertheless, some authors, for example Gollop and Roberts  1  1  (1981. 1983). use the neoclassical approach to study electric 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Best available copyVIEW 
The distinction between the two 
periods is made by estimating separate coeffi- 
cients for them. This allows the production deci- 
sions, as well as the degree of regulatory con- 
straint, to differ between the two periods." 
The k, coefficients measure the 
degree to which the neoclassical first-order con- 
ditions are not satisfied and, hence, serve to test 
for production input biases. If  all ki equal one, 
then shadow prices equal market and rental prices, 
and regulation does not affect production deci- 
sions; actual, not shadow, long-run costs are min- 
imized. If the ki for all inputs except capital 
equal one, then there is only an overcapitaliza- 
tion bias. If  any other ki do not equal one, 
regardless of  the ki value for capital, then the A-J 
view is rejected. 
The results of estimating the 
model over the 1965 to 1982 period show that 
both kK and kF are separately and jointly statisti- 
cally different fiom one at better than a 5 percent 
significance level in both periods.l3 Thus, pro- 
duction efficiency is rejected, and the neoclassical 
cost-function approach for regulated firms 
employed by Gollop and Roberts (1981) and 
others is inappropriate for this sample. Moreover, 
these results reject the A-J view over the whole 
sample; regulation affects the efficient utilization 
of all production inputs by these utilities. 
Another test of the Aj  view, and a 
test of the implications of Joskow's view, is 
whether production inefficiencies resulting from 
regulation differ in the 1965 to 1973 and 1974 to 
1982 periods. The A;T view is that the inefficiencies 
should be the same in each period, while the 
Joskow view is that there should be greater ineffi- 
ciencies in the second period than in the first. 
Two approaches are taken here. In the first, the 
differences in kK and kF  are examined. The A-J 
view is not rejected if the difference in  kK 
between the two periods is insignificantly differ- 
ent &om zero and both kF equal one. If  the 
ki suggest greater inefficiencies in the second 
period than in the first, then the Joskow view is 
not rejected. 
The test results show that the A-J 
view is rejected at better than 0.5 percent, and the 
differences in the kK  and kF coefficients between 
the two periods are significantly different fiom 
zero at better than 5 percent. However, the Jos- 
kow view is also rejected, because the differences 
in the  kK and kF  coefficients, second period 
.......................................... 
A test of  similar production behavior in the two periods was 
convincingly rejected. 
For  technical reasons, only two of  the three k,  can be esti- 
mated.  The k,  coefficient on the price of labor is normalized 
to one, and only k,  and  kF,  for capital and fuel, respectively, are 
estimated. 
minus the first, are significantly negative; to not 
reject Joskow, this difference should have been 
positive. Unfortunately, due to technical reasons 
related to the specification of the cost function, 
the sources of the differences in these coeffi- 
cients cannot be identified. 
The second approach examines 
estimates of the differences in total and dynamic 
inefficiency due to regulation between the two 
periods. The full cost of regulation and, hence, 
the magnitude of the inefficiencies created by 
regulation, cannot be estimated because there is 
no evidence to suggest how the utilities would 
have organized their production had regulation 
not existed over the sample period. Of course, it 
is impossible to know how these utilities would 
have behaved without regulatory constraints. For 
example, the activities of production and distribu- 
tion might have been separated, different 
amounts of capital might have been employed, 
and different technologies might have been 
chosen.'* Hence, it is impossible to know what 
these firms' cost functions and associated returns 
to scale and productivities would have been. 
"Instantaneous"  inefficiency esti- 
mates can be computed, however. A total ineffi- 
ciency measure compares actual utility costs pre- 
dicted by the estimated model with the actual 
costs predicted by the model, but with  kK and 
kF set equal to one in both periods. That is, cur- 
rent production costs for actual levels of output, 
which are generated by current capital, labor, and 
fuel inputs; production techniques;  and regulatory 
constraints, are compared with the costs generated 
with the same input levels and production tech- 
niques and for the same actual output levels, but 
without the regulatory constraints. This estimate, 
also examined by Atkinson and Halvorsen, mea- 
sures the shift in the cost curve due to regulation. 
An estimate of the dynamic notion 
of inefficiency can be obtained by examining the 
technical change experienced by these utilities 
with and without regulation. Technical change is 
defined here as the negative of the derivative of 
total costs with respect to time, holding all other 
factors constant. It is a function of a constant 
term, shadow input prices, output (returns to 
scale), and time, and it shifts the position of a 
firm's average cost curve over time. As above, 
technical change with regulation is that implied 
by the estimated model; technical change with- 
out regulation is that implied by the estimated 
model, but with  kF and  kK set equal to one. 
The difference does not have a real-world coun- 
.......................................... 
Under the current regulatory environment, the production and 
distribution of  electricity must be handled by each utility. 
Moreover, the transferal of electric power across state lines is also 
impeded. 
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terpart or explanation, but it does indicate the 
direction of  regulatory bias. 
These inefficiency estimates provide 
mixed evidence about Joskow's view. The differ- 
ence in the total inefficiency measure between 
the two periods is the opposite of Joskow's expec- 
tation. Instead of greater total inefficiency in the 
second period, when Joskow expects regulatory 
constraints to be binding, our estimates show 
greater total inefficiency in the first period, when 
Joskow expects regulatory constraints to be less 
binding. In the first period, the total inefficiency 
varies between 26 percent and 49 percent and 
averages 36 percent. In the second period, it var- 
ies between 16 percent and 19 percent and aver- 
ages 17 percent. This difference in total ineffi- 
ciency squares with the differences in  kK and  kF 
between the two periods described earlier. 
An  interesting feature of these total 
inefficiency estimates is their large magnitude in 
the first period. Atkinson and Halvorsen find 
much smaller inefficiency losses (9.0 percent) in 
Estimated Technical Change 
Technical change 
in percentage points, average 
Year  over firms 
Average over year 
SOURCE:  Authors. 
their cross-section sample, which includes two of 
our firms.I5 However, the Atkinson and Hal- 
vorsen result captures only the static portion of 
total inefficiency costs because the authors do not 
use time variables in their cost equation. Our 
estimates include the dynamic inefficiency costs 
and, hence, are more representative of the total 
costs of regulation. 
The difference between the Atkin- 
son and Halvorsen result and ours suggests that 
the dynamic inefficiency may be quite large. 
Indeed, we find that regulation retarded the 
growth of technical change, on average, by 0.3 
percentage point per year in the first period and 
by 0.4 percentage point per year in the second. 
This is an important result, and one that has been 
neglected by economists and regulators alike. 
Regulation not only affects the efficient utilization 
of existing production inputs, but it also affects 
the implementation of efficient capital and man- 
agement techniques over time. Unlike our total 
inefficiency estimates, our dynamic inefficiency 
estimates support Joskow's view. 
The behavior of technical change 
over time also confirms Joskow's view. Table 1 
shows the technical-change estimates over the  17 
whole period, averaged over all firms for each 
year. As Joskow argues, the rate of technical 
change is lower in the second period, when he ex- 
pects regulatory constraints to be more binding. 
The most notable characteristic 
about these technical-change estimates is their 
strong downward trend.16 Starting at 0.3 percent 
in 1965, the annual average rate of technical 
change drops steadily each year to -4.6 percent in 
1982. This rather uniform decline, except around 
1973 and 1974, when period one ends and 
period two begins, is due to dominant estimated 
time trends in each period. That shadow input 
prices have little influence on technical change is 
not surprising, because electricity production 
offers little opportunity for input substitution in 
the shoa and medium runs. The time trend cap- 
tures the effects of pure technical change embod- 
ied in the capital investments of these utilities 
and may be additional evidence in hvor of Jos- 
kow's seventh proposition. Although this is not 
conclusive proof of Joskow's seventh proposition, 
because we do not know the nature of the capital 
investments made in these and earlier periods, it 
at least does not contradict it. 
TABLE  1  .......................................... 
.......................................... 
I  l5 
It is likely that our estimates are more accurate for Ohio 
because our  sample includes only Ohio firms, which are fairly 
similar in a number of  important respects, as mentioned earlier. 
16 
A strong downward trend in the rates of  technical change 
experienced by utilities also was found by Nelson and Wohar 
(1983), Gollop and Roberts (1981), and Gollop and Jorgenson (1980), all 
of  whom used samples that ended in the 1970s. Thus, the results report- 
ed here confirm these earlier findings for the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
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IV.  Summary and Conclusions 
Electric utility regulators attempt to maintain a 
competitive price for electricity by adjusting the 
rate of return on a utility's capital. At first blush, 
this price-setting scheme appears sensible. It 
seems reasonably efficient to allow utilities to 
pass along operating costs and cover their cost of 
capital. However, potentially serious problems 
with this type of regulation relate to consumer 
reactions to price increases and to the types of 
incentives given to utilities. First, price increases 
may lower the consumption of electricity, which 
may reduce earned rates of return below "fair" 
rates and trigger a price increase, which in turn 
may lower consumption and trigger another price 
increase, and so on. That is, the proper response 
to falling utility profits because of lower demand 
may not be to raise prices. 
Second, utilities may be able to ef- 
fect price increases by overcapitalizing,  which 
inflates their rate base. Indeed, rate increases 
lower the risk of capital investment below the 
risk level of  unregulated industries, clearly giving 
utilities the incentive to overcapitalize.  This poten- 
tial bias was recognized by Averch and Johnson, 
and many empirical studies that adopted their 
model found an overcapitalization bias. 
Finally, the ability to pass along 
operating cost increases that originated from pro- 
ductivity declines suggests that utilities may not 
have the incentive to raise productivity. This 
dynamic source of inefficiency was recognized by 
Joskow, who also argued that the regulatory 
mechanism is more complicated than that 
assumed by Averch and Johnson. 
This paper is, to our knowledge, 
the first to test the A-J view against Joskow's more 
general view. Using a modified version of the 
generalized long-run cost function derived by 
Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984) and a sample of 
the seven major electric utilities in Ohio over the 
1965 to 1982 period, substantial evidence is 
found against the A-J view. However, the evi- 
dence is not wholly in agreement with Joskow's 
view, either. The circumstantial rate hearing evi- 
dence is consistent with Joskow's view of the 
regulatory mechanism, but our estimation results 
do not wholly confirm the implications Joskow 
draws fi-om his regulatory mechanism. Two sets 
of results imply that regulatory constraints were 
more binding during the years in which Joskow 
expects them to be less binding. Nevertheless, in 
accordance with Joskow's view, we find that regu- 
lation substantially retards the rate of technical 
change experienced by these utilities, and the 
retardation is greater when Joskow expects regu- 
lation to be more binding. This is the first dem- 
onstration of a regulatory impact on technical 
change. It clearly suggests that regulators ought to 
pay closer attention to the incentives they give 
utilities to innovate." 
A reconciliation of these findings is 
difficult. They may suggest that the circumstantial 
rate hearing evidence is not closely correlated with 
the degree of regulatory constraint. Utilities may 
have been constrained in the 1965 to 1973 period 
by the possibility or fear of a rate hearing that 
would eliminate the above "fair" returns they were 
currently earning. Another possibility is that fre- 
quent rate hearings in the 1974 to 1982 period pre- 
vented utilities from artificially fattening their rate 
bases. That is, given the incentive to overcapital- 
ize, utilities were prevented from taking advantage 
of the regulatory system by frequent and accurate 
regulatory review. In this case, the price of elec- 
tricity may have remained close to competitive 
levels, where production, though different fi-om 
monopolistic levels, nonetheless is efficient. The 
poor technical-change performance between 1974 
and 1982 may be the primary cause of the greater 
rate-hearing frequency, and not the reverse. 
Or Joskow may be correct, and utili- 
ties were simply lax about maintaining efficient 
production in the first period, or they anticipated 
future regulatory constraints and took actions to 
fatten their rate bases while they had the oppor- 
tunity.18 Clearly, there is much to learn about the 
impact of regulation on utility performance. 
.......................................... 
The poor technical-change  performance also may be due to  17 increased investment in nuclear power plants. Many of  these 
plants were cancelled after the mid-1970s, but they diverted managerial 
attention and funds away from conventional power-generation capital 
investments. 
18 
Joskow can also be defended by arguing that our inefficiency 
measures are incorrect. As was mentioned earlier, it can 
never be known how utilities would have behaved without regulation. 
Without this knowledge, any inefficiency measure can be faulted. Never- 
theless, the estimated change in kF and  kK  between the two periods 
is hard evidence against Joskow's view. 
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